Research on cascading failure attack and detection of inner-domain routing system

Abstract

Attacks aiming at the vulnerabilities of a BGP self-adaptation mechanism may lead to a cascading failure of the routers, and the inter-domain routing system may even crash. The safety monitoring technologies of existing inter-domain routing systems cannot efficiently detect an attack because the attack flows and updates are practically valid. This is becoming an important and difficult research topic in the field of network security. In this paper, we first analyze the attack methods that may give rise to a cascading failure of an inter-domain routing system, propose a two-stage attack model of BGP cascading failure attacks, and extract the features and onset time of each attack stage. We then classify and elaborate on the current detection approaches, and evaluate them comprehensively from the perspectives of real-time implementation, accuracy, and cost. Finally, the current research issues are described and possible directions for future research are suggested.