Abstract

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

Highlights

  • According to Rawls, due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit

  • (1993) «A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner» // Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol 22, no

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Summary

Нозик 2016

Проблема справедливого распределения ресурсов в обществе относится к числу ключевых для политической мысли. Как заметил один из главных критиков Ролза Роберт Нозик, «отныне политические философы обязаны либо работать в рамках теории Ролза, либо объяснять, почему они этого не делают»2. Значительная часть дискуссий, развернувшихся вокруг концепции Ролза, касается центрального аргумента «Теории справедливости» — обоснования принципа различия через его выбор в исходном положении, за занавесом неведения. Этот интеллектуальный ход предлагался Ролзом лишь как дополнительный довод в пользу принципов справедливости, однако он породил самостоятельную линию рассуждений, получившую развитие в трудах Рональда Дворкина, Джеральда Коэна, Джона Ремера и др. Аргумент Ролза о необходимости компенсировать неравенства, порожденные несправедливой случайностью, обнажил ряд серьезных противоречий в его теории. В первой части статьи рассмотрена аргументация самого Ролза, во второй — критика его заключений Коэном, в третьей и четвертой предложены (с опорой на текст «Теории справедливости») возможные ответы на претензии Коэна, которые оставались бы в рамках ролзовской концепции. 10 См. Nielsen 1979

14 Там же
17 Ролз 2017
28 Там же
32 Cohen 2008
38 Нозик 2016
41 Narveson 2010
43 Narveson 2010
49 Ролз 2017
Full Text
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