Repudiation of the Cultural Revolution in China: The Case of Zhejiang

Abstract

R EFORM OF THE CHINESE political system has followed a steady if unspectacular course since 1978. Deng Xiaoping has approached this most challenging of all his tasks of reform both cautiously and in piecemeal fashion. Yet solid achievements have been scored. Changes to the structure and function of political institutions have accompanied the establishment of new criteria upon which to select personnel for posts in the party, government and military hierarchies. Deng's intention to bequeath a reliable and streamlined administration to his successors has spurred him to press ahead despite the risk of offending the sensibilities of officials upon whom he has previously relied for support. The climax of this five-year push arrived at the end of 1983 with a coordinated and concerted plan to shape the forty-million-strong Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership into a body whose composition would more accurately reflect the new directions of the post-Mao era. In October 1983 the Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee (CC) of the CCP decided on a three-year party rectification programme beginning in the approaching winter.1 Rectification would proceed in two phases. First, leading party bodies at the central and provincial levels, as well as the headquarters of units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would devote a year to the assignment. From the winter of 1984, the operation would shift to the prefectural (district) and county level, and to party branches in grassroots localities, enterprises and institutions. The plenum's decision specified the goals, tasks, stages and methods of rectification, issued a warning against perfunctoriness, and established a Central Commission for Guiding Party Rectification (CCGPR), headed by CC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, to direct the campaign.