Reproach without Blameworthiness

Abstract

Reproach without Blameworthiness Daphne Brandenburg (bio) and Derek Strijbos (bio) In her commentary, Kennett helpfully reiterates Pickard’s criticism of Strawsonian theories of blame (Kennett, 2020). Angry forms of blame like resentment are, according to Pickard, characterized by a sense of entitlement and are counterproductive to therapy. Some disagree that entitlement is a necessary condition for emotional blame, but also more permissive understandings of Strawsonian emotional blame have been considered inappropriate and counterproductive in a therapeutic relationship and on a psychiatric ward. We proposed to bracket definitional issues about the meaning of emotional blame and instead looked at the possible therapeutic role of negative affect in clinical settings. Our paper conceptualizes nurturing reproach as therapeutic expression of negative affective responses to service users. A further conceptual question is whether these forms of reproach can ever be described as blaming or can be responses that track blameworthy persons (Brandenburg, 2019). In our interviews the clinicians insisted that they were not. Indeed, nurturing reproach seems to be quite distinct from Strawsonian reactive attitudes as they are defined by Pickard, Kennett, and others. Yet, some of its justification resonates with the Strawsonian story; congruence, recognition, and arguably the fostering of agency, are values that are also central to his participant stance and are provided as justifications for blaming (Strawson, 2008). Yet, these values are arrived at via other means than expressions of blame. Another way in which nurturing reproach differs from the Strawsonian story is in its appropriateness towards persons who do not (yet) have sufficient control and understanding to be considered blameworthy for harm. Reproach can be appropriate towards agents who are yet to acquire the understanding and control that is needed for regulating their own behaviors and carrying full responsibility. We, for example, express such reproachful affect towards young children as well. This observation is not made to compare service users to children. What it suggests is that negative affect can nurture agency when a person’s agency falls below the threshold deemed necessary for responsibility and blameworthiness for harm. It is an open question whether a similar distinction can be made between our and Pickard’s approach. As Kennett pointed out, our approach has a different starting point. When engaged in nurturing reproach, one does not attribute blameworthiness due to doubt about their level of agency with regards to the transgression. In contrast, Pickard maintains that service users with addiction or borderline personality disorder, typically have sufficient agency (Pickard, 2013). They have choice and control and are therefore responsible for harm. But, on her account, this is not to say they are always also blameworthy for harm and most certainly does not render blame an appropriate response. It may be that there are differences in the levels of agency within the patient populations that informed [End Page 399] these two approaches. Nurturing reproach may be appropriate for persons who are not yet (fully) responsible for harm, whereas the clinical stance tracks persons who are responsible for harm. Another possible explanation for this difference is conceptual disagreement about the level of agency that suffices for being responsible for harm. The threshold of agency required for being responsible and blameworthy is both vague and contested. What matters for practical purposes is that a nurturing stance is not only distinct from emotional blame but also suspends more cognitive attributions of blameworthiness entirely. As Kennett suggests, the interesting and as of yet unanswered next question is: what renders the different therapeutic approaches appropriate for particular persons in particular contexts? We spend quite some time on discussing the particular commitments of the service user as one possible indication for using one approach over another. Kennett rightly points out that responsibility without blame is employed in treatment programs that both the service user and clinician are committed to. Why then did we spend some time exploring this? Some clarification is in order. First, we do not believe that either of these two therapeutic approaches should be conceived as belonging specifically to one or other particular treatment program. Rather, our bet is there will be a place for both in most programs, depending on the characteristics of the person, and the specific situation at hand. For...