Reply to my critics

Luigi Caranti

doi:10.36311/2318-0501.2018.v6n1.01.p97

Abstract

In this essay I reply to the very interesting comments about my book Kant’s Political Legacy. Human Rights, Peace, Progress (University of Wales Press 2017) offered by the following Kant scholars: Alessandro Pinzani, Cristina Foroni Consani, Milene Consenso Tonetto, Delamar José Vulpato Dutra, Robinson dos Santos, Andrea Faggion, Aylton Barbieri and Joel Thiago Klein. A theme on which my critics commonly insist is the compatibility between Kant’s theory of right (in particular some of the rights and duties spelt out in the Rechtslehre) and the values central in the culture human rights. Another one is whether it makes sense to use an essentially moral concept, such as that of dignity, for the foundation of human rights, given that they are usually conceived of as juridical or proto-juridical rights. In general all commentators raise informed and well documented points that deserve keen attention.

Highlights

In this essay I reply to the very interesting comments about my book Kant’s Political Legacy
Pinzani’s concluding remarks insist precisely on the possibility to qualify my foundational strategy as Kantian. He says, how one can derive the idea of human rights from Kant’s juridical and political philosophy, no matter whether one starts from the concept of external freedom understood as autonomy, or from the idea of dignity, or from the status Kant attributes to citizens within the state
In criticizing my interpretation of the reason Kant offers to ground our innate right to freedom - Kant says we have it ‘by virtue of [our] humanity’ (MS 237) ‒ Barbieri argues that I fail to distinguish between two notions present in Kant’s thought: an ethical and a juridical notion of humanity

Summary

Introduction

In this essay I reply to the very interesting comments about my book Kant’s Political Legacy. Since Pinzani, unlike other critics, does not question the prospects of a foundation of human rights based on Kant’s ethical notion of autonomy per se, but only the possibility to read in Kant such a strategy, let’s focus on this last point.

Results

Conclusion