Kantian Cosmopolitanism and the Challenge of its Racist Prejudices

Abstract

In the years 1788, Kant develops a conception of racial inequality in which he not only affirms the superiority of the « European » white race over other races, but also appears to approve of the enslavement of Black people. Kant’s theory of racial inequality baffles many, considering that in the moral philosophy he develops during the same period, he makes no compromises on the inviolability of human dignity. The aim of this text is not to deny Kant’s racism between 1764 and 1790, which is evident in his courses on physical geography and anthropology, but rather to demonstrate that Kant’s primary objective, which he never loses sight of in his various writings on race, is to explain the unity in diversity of the human species. While Kant’s theory of racial inequalities leaves no doubt about his racism between 1764 and 1790, it is inaccurate to claim that he remained constant in his views on non-European peoples. From 1795 onwards, in the Project for a Perpetual Peace and later in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant reevaluates his appreciation of non-European peoples, develops a more egalitarian conception of rights and race, and condemns European colonization.