Replik auf Dews und ein Plädoyer für Schelling

Abstract

Abstract In his article, “Theory Construction and Existential Description in Schelling’s Treatise on Freedom”, Peter Dews argues that the dual methodology for addressing the problem of freedom, which Schelling describes in the opening paragraph of the text, has often been overlooked in the secondary literature. He therefore criticizes my interpretation of Schelling’s treatise for arguing that the ontology it proposes is entirely constructed from the practical standpoint, by analogy with Kant’s extrapolation of an ontic ground from our consciousness of the normativity of pure reason. While agreeing that Schelling does not equate morality with the practical effectivity of pure reason, as does Kant, I defend the view that Schelling is nevertheless operating from the standpoint of his own conception of practical consciousness. This interpretation is made more plausible by the fact that he had not decided between various methodological options at this point in his career. In the final part of the “Reply” I argue that contemporary philosophical treatments of the problem of freedom, which incline towards an empirical compatibilism, appear superficial when compared with the exemplary grasp of the problem shown by the German Idealists, including Schelling.