Abstract
Since Marantz (1984) and Kratzer (1996), it has been widely accepted in the literature on argument structure that agents are introduced as external arguments via a functional head VOICE through secondary predication, using semantic composition rules like EVENT IDENTIFICATION. The widely cited evidence for such a position is the fact that while internal arguments can condition special semantic interpretations of the surface verb, agents never do. In this paper, we present evidence against such a view, arguing that a well-defined class of verbs can impose intentionality entailments and also require representation of the agent argument internally within their lexical semantics. The crucial empirical evidence we utilize is modification by again, specifically the range of available repetitive presuppositions it can introduce. We show that again behaves differently with respect to how its repetitive presupposition can be satisfied by verbal roots whose agent argument is introduced externally versus verbal roots that must entail intentionality and representation of its agent argument. Together with widely accepted assumptions about the syntax and semantics of again-modification, we argue that not all external arguments can be severed from the verbal root.
Highlights
Since Marantz (1984) and Kratzer (1996), it has been widely accepted in the literature on argument structure that agents are introduced as external arguments via a functional head VOICE through secondary predication, using semantic composition rules like EVENT IDENTIFICATION
While Bale (2007) uses again-modification to illustrate that non-stative transitive verbs associate with their external arguments differently from stative transitive and intransitive verbs, we show that even within the class of transitive verbs, one is able to distinguish different sub-classes that associate with their agent arguments internally rather than externally
That Folli and Harley’s (2005) analysis makes the wrong predictions even when they attempt to dissociate animacy requirements from VOICE shows that the intentionality entailments as we√ll as representation of the √agent argument must be truly internal to the lexical semantics of MURDER-type roots, while
Summary
Since Marantz (1984) and Kratzer (1996), it has been widely accepted in the literature on argument structure that agents are introduced as external arguments via a functional head VOICE through secondary predication, using semantic composition rules like EVENT IDENTIFICATION. It is important to note that while MURDER-type roots seem to entail intentionality, the entailment app√lies only to the intention of the external argument in carrying out a killing event. MURDER-type roots entail that the external argument must have the intention of carrying out the event denoted by the verbal root, but need not result in the intended entity becoming the holder of the result state.4 This can be brought out by the following context, using murder as an example.
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