Abstract
An influential proposal about the status of a verb’s agent argument maintains they are severed from the verb’s argument structure and introduced as external arguments via functional heads in the syntax (Kratzer 1996). Nonetheless, there are various conceptual and empirical arguments against this view (e.g., Dowty 1989; Wechsler 2005; Bale 2007; Müller & Wechsler 2014; Wechsler 2020). In this paper, we build on Bale’s (2007) arguments that transitivity plays a role in whether a verb’s external argument can be introduced outside the domain of the verb. Specifically, he argues based on sub-lexical modification with again that only eventive transitive verbs have their external arguments severed from the verb, and stative transitive and intransitive verbs do not. We present empirical evidence against this macro-classification, showing that particular classes of eventive transitive verbs, namely verbs of killing like murder, slay, slaughter, massacre, and assassinate in fact do not permit what Bale calls subjectless (agentless) presuppositions. Given an understanding of again’s presupposition being uniquely determined by the structural constituent it attaches to (Dowty 1979; von Stechow 1996; Beck & Johnson 2004; Bale 2007), this must mean that these verbs cannot have their external arguments severed, contra Bale’s generalization. Further we claim that intentionality entailments, which are often taken to be entailments of an Agent thematic role (Dowty 1991; Kratzer 1996), can in fact be dissociated from the syntactic introduction of the agent argument, and that certain verbs can lexically introduce them without directly introducing their agents. This is argued for by examining what we call manner of forced taking verbs like confiscate, snatch, and seize, which permit agentless presuppositions with again but still impose intentionality requirements on their subjects. We provide a compositional semantics for these two classes of verbs capturing these facts, and close with some speculations about the nature of intentionality entailments in regard to Rappaport Hovav & Levin’s (2010) MANNER/RESULT COMPLEMENTARITY.
Highlights
IntroductionEvidence for such a position is the fact that while internal arguments can condition special semantic interpretations of the surface verb, external arguments never do (Marantz 1984)
The empirical observation is that while these verbs require intentionality to be presupposed with again, the actual agent argument need not be the same across presupposition and assertion, i.e., agentless presuppositions are allowed. This must mean that the agent argument can be severed from the verb, but not intentionality requirements. Based on these two classes of verbs, we propose an analysis where agent arguments and intentionality entailments can be introduced by the lexical semantic root in the Distributed Morphology (DM) sense for murder-type verbs, whereas only intentionality is introduced by the root for steal-type verbs
We will proceed to argue that while intentionality can be dissociated from the external argument, general linguistics we differ in that we will argue for intentionality entailments being included within a root’s semantics rather than being introduced by functional heads
Summary
Evidence for such a position is the fact that while internal arguments can condition special semantic interpretations of the surface verb, external arguments never do (Marantz 1984). Under these approaches, the agent argument as well as associated entailments like intentionality (Dowty 1991) are assumed to reside in functional structures in the syntax introduced through the functional head Voice.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
