Abstract

Repetition increases belief in false statements. This illusory truth effect occurs with many different types of statements (e.g., trivia facts, news headlines, advertisements), and even occurs when the false statement contradicts participants’ prior knowledge. However, existing studies of the effect of prior knowledge on the illusory truth effect share a common flaw; they measure participants’ knowledge after the experimental manipulation and thus conditionalize responses on posttreatment variables. In the current study, we measure prior knowledge prior to the experimental manipulation and thus provide a cleaner measurement of the causal effect of repetition on belief. We again find that prior knowledge does not protect against the illusory truth effect. Repeated false statements were given higher truth ratings than novel statements, even when they contradicted participants’ prior knowledge.

Highlights

  • Participants are less likely to accept falsehoods that contradict well-known facts (e.g. “Elephants weigh less than ants”) as compared to false statements that contradict more obscure knowledge (e.g. “Oslo is the capital of Finland”) (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Fazio, Rand, & Pennycook, 2019)

  • People continue to rely on these proximal cues, such as repetition, even when they have access to more direct signals of truth such as prior knowledge and source reliability (Fazio et al, 2015; Fazio et al, 2019; Fazio & Sherry, in press; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2018)

  • Repeated falsehoods were rated as being more true than novel falsehoods, even when they both contradicted participants’ prior knowledge

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Summary

Introduction

Repeated false statements were given higher truth ratings than novel statements, even when they contradicted participants’ prior knowledge. People continue to rely on these proximal cues, such as repetition, even when they have access to more direct signals of truth such as prior knowledge and source reliability (Fazio et al, 2015; Fazio et al, 2019; Fazio & Sherry, in press; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2018). While people pay attention to cues such as prior knowledge and source credibility when judging truth, they are affected by proximal cues such as repetition. Participants first rated the truth of a series of new and repeated general knowledge facts (e.g., “A prune is a dried plum”). They were asked a series of multiple-choice questions as a knowledge check

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