Abstract
A plethora of arguments from the ‘public choice school’ suggest that public goods are ‘under‐supplied’ by comparison with public sector provision of more private goods. The implication is that rent seeking by the ‘military‐industrial complex’ serves, in some measure, to offset potential allocative inefficiency. In this paper a comparison of rent seeking by producers of public goods and producers of private goods identifies a bias that favours public good supply. The bias results from the different way in which collective demand for public goods and for private goods is expressed. The prospect of larger rents to the ‘military‐industrial complex’ implies greater rent‐seeking expenditures in this sector. The extent to which public goods (and, in particular, defence) are ‘under supplied’ is much exaggerated.
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