Abstract
Recent approaches to scepticism have followed a pattern which Descartes was the first modern to outline with anything approaching clarity. He is not often given credit for the best of his insights here largely because they are obscured by misleading theological assumptions, yet once these assumptions are removed we should be impressed by the subtle ring of the underlying account of rational belief. To demonstrate these claims the first section of this essay discusses the irrelevance of Descartes’ theology to his epistemology — the misère of the title — the second, devoted to the grandeur, expounds his operative theory of reasonable belief, and the remainder applies this theory to Descartes’ original sceptical problem and offers some comment both on its strength and its weakness.Descartes is less careful than he might be in formulating the exact form of the most general sceptical doubt that he aims to rebut. On some occasions he appears to be asking the question (1) and, on others, the question (2).
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