On Behalf of the Evidentialist — a Response to Wolterstorff

This study investigates the principles and arguments of JH Newman's Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Newman argued that the mind receives impressions of revealed truth, which form a real and permanent inward knowledge that may be recognised implicitly or explicitly by those who possess it. This recognition is considered by Newman to be an insight into the act of assent to religious belief before it can be understood and explained. According to Newman's epistemology as articulated in the Grammar (in the principles of perception, apprehension, assent and inference, first principles, conscience, certitude and the illative sense) the human person can believe without understanding and proof. This is the hypothesis that is the driving force of this study that uses bracketing to isolate Key Stage Three (11-14 years) pupil insights in accord with qualitative research methods. The pupils of a Catholic Comprehensive in the Greater London area in this study discovered and experimented with age-old and contemporary conventions within the domain of the Philosophy of Religion in response to problem-solving tasks set on the doctrine of the Trinity. This teaching and learning took place long before a secular educational paradigm driven by stage theory would consider feasible. The perception of doctrine as provocative educational materials that the Catholic Church enforces through the processes of indoctrination is not verified in this study. The cognitive challenges of doctrine were found to be no more or less than the cognitive capacities of students. Teaching methodology needs to take a strong account of the teacher as expert as well as the teacher as facilitator of learning. Newman's epistemology reveals the human person as a believing person demonstrating the inherent capacity to believe is critical to an understanding of how pupils learn in religious and non-religious matters.

I want to begin by congratulating Stephen Mulhall on his beautifully written and solidly constructed paper. The title given, ‘Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion’ allowed the possibility of a wide approach to be taken to the subject, and Mulhall has taken full advan­tage of this space in his tripartite response. The excellence of some sec­tions of his paper has rendered any further comment on them wholly superfluous. I have particularly in mind those parts in which Mulhall is critical of other writers, such as his penetratingly astute arguments against John Hyman in both the first and second divisions of the paper. However, no two people would have approached this set topic in the same way, and there are some issues which I would have liked to have Zeen given greater emphasis, especially the assessment of Wittgenstein’s contribution to the philosophy of religion. But I also think that, in some ways, Mulhall could have been more critical of Wittgenstein’s own views on religion. I appreciate that these comments are, of course, essentially evaluative, and I found it difficult to discover much that is amiss with Mulhall’s logic. In my reply I wish to concentrate primarily on the first part of Mulhall’s paper which deals specifically with Wittgenstein’s own comments on religion, including those remarks contained in the celebrated three lectures on religious belief, although what I have to say about these has some bearing on issues raised in the other two sections of Mulhall’s essay.

C.S. Lewis's interests and arguments range widely across the arts and the sciences. He noted the transience of models of the universe and described them as representations of current knowledge; composites of science, philosophy, theology and culture. He observed how they communicate meaning and influence popular thinking, and used them as a backdrop to his art. This thesis is an analytical and interpretive reading of his worldview expressed in various genres. His fantasy stories are evidence of his claim that the imaginative man within him was older and more basic than the religious writer or critic. The research investigates his fusion of intellect and imagination for dialectic, aesthetic, ethical and spiritual ends, at a time of conflict and uncertainty. Against the tide of materialism and secularism, Lewis set out to explain and clarify Christian cosmology as a rational alternative to the seemingly purposeless and meaningless emptiness of Space. Models are big picture metaphors and the research explores Lewis's prolific use of metaphor, intrinsic to his method in elucidating the complexities of philosophy and theology to the wider public. The thesis does not attempt to fit him into a particular theoretical framework, in deference to his many-sided approach to various subjects, and his dislike of restrictive labels. The 'warfare' theme in the thesis title relates to Lewis's engagement with progressive philosophies and man-centred epistemologies. The aggressive tactics of 'New Atheism' in the twenty-first century have given his apologetic texts even greater relevance. His books and essays challenge the assumed 'conflict narrative' regarding science and religion, encouraging dialogue rather than inflammatory rhetoric. His arguments speak for themselves, not as relics of a past age but as valuable insights into the issues of the here and now.

PART I: FOUNDATIONS 1. EPISTEMOLOGY AND POSTMODERN RESISTANCE 2. TRUTH 3. THE FRAMEWORK PART II: GENERIC SOCIAL PRACTICES 4. TESTIMONY 5. ARGUMENTATION 6. THE TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF COMMUNICATION 7. SPEECH REGULATION AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS PART III: SPECIAL DOMAINS 8. SCIENCE 9. LAW 10. DEMOCRACY 11. EDUCATION BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX.

The concept of gloria is a legitimately philosophical notion — and not just a theological one — that plays a crucial role in Aquinas’ philosophy of religion. Despite this fact, the concept has been given little philosophical attention in the secondary literature. The aim of this essay is twofold: (1) to fill this lacuna by showing the crucial role this concept plays in Aquinas’ religious ethics and metaphysics of creation, in particular in his account of the finality of both the human virtues and of the created universe; and also (2) to show that it is essentially a philosophical concept that despite its theological connotations and applications can be handled rationally and independently of divine revelation.

Islam Dusunce tarihinde, Islam'i anlama, aciklama ve yasamaya yo-nelik birbirinden farkli yorum gele-nekleri ortaya cikmistir. Akla onem veren ve farkliliklarin bir arada yasamasina imkân taniyan bir dusunme bicimine sahip Akilci-Hadari zihniyet bu geleneklerden birisidir ve Imam Mâturidi bu zih niyetin en onemli temsilci-lerindendir. O, dini bilgi uretmede kendine ozgu bir bilgi kurami gelistirmis , akli da bu kuramin merkezine yerlestirmistir. O bu dogrultuda pek cok meseleyi tartismis ve ozgun yorumlar gelistirmistir. Din-Seriat ayrimi bunlar arasinda en dikkat cekenidir. Mâturidi'ye gore din akilla irtibatlidir; inanc ve itikadi kapsar. Buna karsin seriat ise daha cok vahiyle iliskilidir; ibadetleri ve diger dini hukumleri ifade eder. Bu bakis acisi, Mâturidi'yi insan aklina seriatte tasarruf hakki tanimaya ve ser'i hukumlerde ictihatla nesh etmenin imkani fikrine goturmustur. Maturidi'nin dinle seriati ayirmasi ve akla seriatta tasarruf hakki vermesi, hirsizlikla ilgili Kur'an'da gecen cezanin gunumuzde yeniden dusunulmesine imkan vermektedir. Bu dogrultuda el kesme cezasi analiz edilmektedir.

Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas. Centro Cientifico Tecnologico Conicet - Cordoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Cordoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentina

Epistemology and ethics of belief is one of the most important and serious problems in philosophy and philosophy of religion. Is there, for belief, any standard or criteion to be rational and, if any, what are? Is true and valid belief equivalent to rational belief? Is there any rational basis of religious belief and especially God-belief? Or are those irrational? What is the nature of relation between belief, knowledge and ethics? Such questions as these quoted above have been vehemently discussed and answered from different philosophical aspects and several point of views. Chief among them rationalism, pragmatism, intuitionism and fideism can be listed as remarkable and noteworthy. In this paper we have considered, of these, only two, namely rationalism and fideism. In particular, the challenging and severe argument of William K. Clifford against belief in anything upon insufficient evidence, who is a strong and radical rationalist, was explained and then we seized on four conter-argument which can be taken out of philosophical writings of some thinkers. Wittgensteinian fideism, Kierkegaard’s irrationalism, Pascal’s argument of wager and moral evidence of Kant are those. And occasionally we criticised all the views and drew some conclusion and finally evaluated them

La filosofía de la religión y la mística del último Tugendhat se inserta en el centro de su etapa antropológica, pero guarda relación con toda su obra precedente. Las raíces antropológicas de la espiritualidad se hallan en la autoconciencia práctica o existencial, que se refiere al conjunto de nuestra vida y está expuesta —more heideggeriano— a la contingencia. A esta responden, según Tugendhat, la religión, con su creencia en seres espirituales (que él rechaza enérgicamente), y diversas formas de místicas orientales impersonales, como el budismo y el tao, que atemperan la voracidad de un yo egocéntrico. El artículo analiza la teorización tugendhatiana de ambos fenómenos y discute su argumento en pro del ateísmo, por mor de la “honestidad intelectual”, lo mismo que su pretensión de tomar las doctrinas místicas únicamente en su vertiente práctico-existencial.

I define the sense of Revelation that was a very important element in the making of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion. Naturally, the Prussian philosopher analyzed Christian doctrines searching for some theoretical inspiration. However, he asserts that relevant ideas of his thought or religion were in fact inspired by the reading of the Bible ideas such as those of revelation, and radical evil. Christian faith is highly appreciated by Kant among the world’s religions, because historically it has been a formidable promoter of moral education. Kant’s idealism, by the way, compels him to deny some importance to Christian theology, it is instead the true meaning of Christian doctrines, should be determined by rational theology, the part of the philosophical reflexion dealing with religions questions. The Kant’s rationalism could be corrected by greater attention to the value of Christian revelation. In conclusion, the article notes that in Kant the structure of freedom restricts the meaning of the salvific event according the Revelation. Key words: Kant, Revelation, Faith, Reason, Freedom, and practice.

Resumen

Book Review: Affirmations of Christian Belief

Like many other developing countries, Vietnam recently imported a Western-style competition law. Given its potential impact on the way the government regulates the market and on market behaviour, there is considerable scholarly and commercial interest in understanding how this law has been functioning and in predicting its future. This study was compiled to address these concerns. Departing from the existing literature that mostly examines the law from a political economy perspective, this study took an interpretive approach in the belief that the manner in which the law is adapted and implemented ultimately rests on the interpretive perspectives of key actors, such as legislative drafters and the state officials responsible for implementing the law. It explored how Western competition law ideas have been interpreted, adapted and implemented in Vietnam. This study drew on systems theory and discourse analysis as its analytical framework. It adopted the insights offered by systems theory that societies are comprised of different social subsystems that interpret legal transfers through their own self-referential modes of thought. It applied the methodological tools offered by discourse analysis theories to analyse how Western competition law ideas were communicated and interpreted by key Vietnamese state actors. This study examined the interpretive discourses about competition law at three levels of party and state: high level policy making, law making and law implementation. The study found various narratives circulating at these levels, many of which conflict with the neoliberal free market competition philosophy that underpins the imported competition law. The most prominent contradictory narratives were state economic management, the leading role of the state economic sector, economic protectionism and nationalism. What the study showed was that these socialist, developmental and nationalistic narratives often prevailed, but over time imported competition ideas gained ground and have ‘irritated’ changes in the dominant views. The study found that state actors at each of the three levels of party and state coalesced into groups that supported different sets of ideas about competition. These groups used their political power to strategically promote particular interpretations of the competition law. This has fragmented the way the law is interpreted and implemented. Since only a small number of comparatively weak groups, such as the Vietnam Competition Administration Department, have strongly supported the imported regime, the study predicts that socialist, developmental and nationalistic thinking will continue to dominate the interpretation and implementation of competition law in the short to medium term.

How legitimate is the current demand that religion play an ever more prominent role in public life? Should religious institutions and beliefs enjoy free rein in the life of a democracy or should they be subject to certain limitations, and if so, which ones? The answers to these questions lie in the following three theses. First of all, a correct system of norms cannot be based on an analysis of modern rationality, on the relationship between modern rationality and religion or on an analysis of the process of secularization. It can only be based on an analysis of modern political structures. Secondly, it therefore holds that the « liberal-democratic solution », duly revised and modified, provides the only way forward. In particular the Rawlsian concept of «public reason» provides ample room for religion in public life while allowing for limitations to be devised and defined. Last, the concepts of modern rationality and secularization should be taken into consideration at a later stage, as epistemic premises of religious freedom and not as fundamental norms.

Wittgensteinian approaches to issues in the philosophy of religion have plainly been amongst the most consequential in the discipline in the postwar period. This is not, of course, because a general consensus in their favour has been established; on the contrary, if anything unites contemporary philosophers of religion, it is their deep suspicion of both the specific claims and the general methodology of those of their colleagues who have adopted a Wittgensteinian perspective. Nevertheless, it is rare to find a philosopher of religion who does not define her own position, at least in part, by specifying the nature of and the grounds for her rejection of work carried out under the Wittgensteinian banner. In this respect, that work continues to function as an essential reference point in the discipline — something that can no longer be said of many other fields of philosophical endeavour, even in the philosophy of mind or the philosophy of language (where some of Wittgenstein’s specific claims continue to attract interest, but the general methodological principles which anchor and account for them are barely mentioned, let alone specifically criticized).