Abstract

Recently, remote voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Switzerland as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France. Current remote voting schemes assume either the voter’s personal computer is trusted or the voter is not physically coerced. In this chapter, we describe a remote end-to-end voting scheme [23], in which the voter’s choice remains secret even if the voter’s personal computer is infected by malware or the voter is physically controlled by the adversary. Based on homomorphic encryption, the overhead for tallying in such scheme is linear in the number of candidates. Thus, such scheme is practical for elections at a large scale, such as general elections.KeywordsVoting SchemeRemote VotingMalwareTallying AuthoritiesUntappable ChannelThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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