Remembering the importance of preventing blood‐borne infections in the critical care setting

Abstract

Despite widespread concern and knowledge about the need for infection prevention and control in health care, it is clear that adherence to strict infection control procedures is not always at an optimal level (El-Masri and Oldfield, 2012). Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) may occur when these standards break down, and HAI is a commonly discussed media topic (Bates, 2012). Alarmingly, a recent outbreak of Hepatitis C in the USA, resulting from inappropriate interference by health staff with equipment (needles) (Ramer, 2012) reminds us that even when vigilant approaches are used to combat the spread of infection, the potential for contamination from blood-borne infections remains a real possibility. Blood-borne viral infections include human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), Hepatitis C virus (HCV) and Hepatitis B virus (HBV). Taking precautions alone is not sufficient; staffs need to be knowledgeable in the disease and spread of disease. It is important to note that the risk of disease spread is to both staff and patients, although most staffs are vaccinated to prevent HBV (DoHC, 2005). While discussion papers and research studies on the topics of blood-borne diseases such as HCV, HBV and HIV/Aids are reduced in number compared with the 1980s and 1990s, current literature appears to indicate that knowledge deficits exist among nurses with regard to both HCV (Frazer et al., 2011) and HIV/Aids (Delobelle et al., 2009), and education and training specifically on these topics seems to be inconsistent and in some cases minimal (Delobelle et al., 2009; Frazer et al., 2011). This editorial discusses how blood-borne viruses (BBVs) can be best prevented in the health care setting in order to highlight the need for ongoing vigilance. An increased incidence of HBV and HCV transmission in the USA is associated with unsafe medical practices (Moore et al., 2011) particularly in those persons aged over 55 (Perz et al., 2012). These two viruses are the most prevalent in the USA with an estimated 1·4 million persons chronically infected with HBV and 3·2 million persons chronically infected with HCV (Weinbaum et al., 2008). A BBV is transmitted through contact with blood or body fluids typically through sexual or household contact, intravenous drug use or other parenteral exposures (Wise et al., 2012). Within health care settings, BBV transmission occurs through direct percutaneous inoculation of infected blood via needlestick or sharps injury or by blood splashed onto broken skin or mucous membranes (Stein et al., 2003). Health care workers (HCWs) undertaking exposure-prone procedures (EPPs) are also at risk of contracting BBVs (DoHC, 2005). The average risk of occupational HIV transmissions associated with percutaneous exposure to blood is 0·32% (approximately 1 infection in 325 documented exposures to blood from HIV-infected individuals) and for mucosal exposures it is 0·03% (approximately 1 infection for each 3300) (Henderson, 2012). The risk of occupational HBV infection following a parenteral exposure from an HBV-infected source patient with circulating e antigen is between 19% and 37% (Werner and Grady, 1982). The risk of occupational infection with HCV following parenteral exposure to blood from HCV-infected source patient is estimated at 1·9% per exposure (Henderson, 2003). In 1985, following an HIV epidemic, the Centre's for Disease Control (CDC) developed recommendations for prevention of HIV transmission in health care settings known as universal precautions (UP) (CDC, 1987). Blood was identified as the single most important source of HIV and HBV (Garner and Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996). As it is impossible to identify all patients that are sero-positive to HIV, HBV or HCV, UP dictates that all patients should be regarded as a potential biohazard (Garner and Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996; DoH UK, 1998). However, body substance isolation precautions (aimed at regarding all moist and body substances as potentially infectious) are familiar to all nurses as they are in use since 1987 (Garner and Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996). CDC then produced a two tier isolation precaution system known as standard precautions (SP) (Garner and Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996; Siegel et al., 2007). The first tier is designed for the care of all patients in hospitals, regardless of diagnosis or presumed infection status. The second tier, ‘Transmission-Based Precautions’ is for patients known or suspected to be infected by a transmissible infection (Garner and Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, 1996; Siegel et al., 2007). SP principles include hand hygiene, patient isolation, personal protective equipment (PPE), personal and environmental hygiene, appropriate management of linen and health care waste, including sharps. Hand hygiene is the most important principle to prevent the spread of infection (WHO, 2009; HPSC, 2011a, 2011b). Hand hygiene includes hand-washing with soap (or antimicrobial soap) and water or alcohol gel. It also prescribes that cuts and abrasions are covered with waterproof dressings (WHO, 2009; HPSC, 2011a, 2011b). Stein et al. (2003) illustrated that while doctors understood the importance of hand hygiene, only 7 in 10 followed it frequently in practice. Patients with a BBV should be risk assessed to determine the type of isolation required. Patients that are actively bleeding or with large open wounds require contact precaution isolation (Siegel et al., 2007). Signs alerting staff to the type of isolation should be placed on the door and appropriate PPE should be available. PPE such as gloves and/or apron are required in the event of exposure to blood or body fluids (Siegel et al., 2007). Seventy-one percent of doctors do not wear gloves when taking blood despite 83% believing it important (Stein et al., 2003). Masks are not usually necessary unless to protect from other active infectious diseases, e.g. a patient with pulmonary tuberculosis. The environment should be cleaned daily with detergent and water and disinfected in the event of blood or body fluid spill. Blood spills require appropriate action, e.g. use of spill kits with PPE; appropriate disinfection agents to kill any viruses present; disposable scoops and yellow health care waste bags. Blood spills must be managed and decontaminated to prevent persons becoming contaminated (Siegel et al., 2007). The environment and instruments can also become contaminated with blood. This can lead to infection outbreaks such as the case of podiatry instruments that were the source of an outbreak of HBV in a long-term care facility (Wise et al., 2012). Health care waste is divided into health care risk waste and health care non-risk waste (DoHC, 2010). Health care risk waste includes any item contaminated with blood. Blood-stained products must be appropriately discarded in the yellow health care risk waste stream. If blood is in liquid form, a yellow rigid spill-proof container is used. Needles and sharps should be discarded in designated sharps containers (DoHC, 2010). Needlestick injuries (NSI) or sharps injuries must be managed appropriately. US surveillance indicates more than 380 000 parenteral annual exposures to blood. This equates to nearly 1 in 10 US HCWs receiving a needlestick exposure annually (Panlilio et al., 2004). Alarmingly, Delobelle et al.'s figure (as reported by the nurses themselves in response to survey) was as high as 7 of 10. The discrepancies in figures could be due to underreporting of NSI, which does occur in health care, and it is believed that doctors are least likely to report NSI (Stein et al., 2003). It is very important for nurses in critical care who are exposed to an NSI to perform first-aid to the injury and report to their supervisor and Occupational Health /Emergency Department. Occupational exposure should be assessed and treated accordingly, for example by immunization, hepatitis B immune globulin and post exposure chemoprophylaxis for exposure to HIV. There are also emotional effects of such exposure such as stress (Henderson, 2012) which need to be dealt with as well as financial implications. The cost of management of occupational exposures to blood and body fluids can vary from $71 to $4838 per exposure (O'Malley et al., 2007). An EU directive (2010/32/EU) was published in May 2010 (Council Directive, 2010). Its objective is to achieve the safest possible work environment for HCWs through the prevention of sharps injuries. All health care organizations must comply with this directive, which becomes legally binding on 11 May 2013 (European Biosafety Network, 2010). Perz et al. (2012) determined that unsafe injection practices account for a proportion of HBV acquisitions in health care settings (e.g. use of multi-dose vials; incorrect administration of injections resulting in microscopic quantities of blood contaminating the environment). An outbreak of HCV was identified in an outpatient's clinic where myocardial perfusion imaging was undertaken (Moore et al., 2011). It was determined that a nuclear medicine technologist routinely drew flushes of saline solution from multi-dose vials using the same needle and syringe as had previously been used to administer radiopharmaceutical doses (Moore et al., 2011). In addition, Fischer et al. (2010) highlighted HCV transmission resulting from contamination of single-use medication vials used on multiple patients during anaesthesia administration. As a consequence, more than 50 000 persons required follow-up by Public Health. This investigation highlighted breaches in aseptic technique and deficiencies in oversight within outpatient settings. BBV outbreaks have also been caused through blood glucose monitoring. Five instances of HBV in UK care homes resulted from poor infection control practice in blood glucose testing (Duffell et al., 2011). HBV outbreak was also noted in a long-stay facility where blood glucose monitoring devices were not decontaminated between patients. This resulted in HBV transmission to at least six residents (Schaffzin et al., 2012). HCV has also been transmitted by shared spring-triggered capillary blood glucose monitoring (Desenclos et al., 2001). Recently, Perz et al. (2012) identified haemodialysis as another risk factor in blood-borne pathogen transmission, while several documented cases of patient-to-patient HCV transmission via colonoscope exist (González-Candelas et al., 2010). Most occupational exposures occur on wards (36%), operating theatres account for 17% of incidents (HPA, 2008). Once a BBV is diagnosed in a health care setting, a local investigation is necessary to determine whether the infection is considered as nosocomial. Under the Infectious Disease Regulations (1981) the Department of Public Health must be notified of HBV and HCV infections. A patient notification exercise (PNE) is undertaken using ‘Guidance on the management and investigation of potential exposure to BBVs in health care setting’ (DoHC, 2005). Surveillance is a key performance indicator in the management of HCAI. Early identification of outbreaks and active surveillance of occupational exposures is also necessary. Occupational exposures include percutaneous exposures, where skin has been broken by a needle or sharp, human scratches or bites and mucotaneous exposures (HPA, 2008). Between 1997 and 2008, 3773 occupational exposures to blood or other high risk body fluids were reported to the Health Protection Agency in the UK (HPA, 2008). Feedback from surveillance and good communication informs staff of risks and of appropriate precautions. A study by Donohue et al. (2012) included recommendations such as enhanced surveillance of BBV notifications; sufficient laboratory resources; improved hospital information systems; the establishment of a national register of possible incidents of BBV transmission and that findings of investigations should be published. These would contribute to the further prevention of BBV within the health care setting. Transmission of BBVs in health care settings was believed to occur most frequently during EPPs; however, there is growing evidence of patient-to-patient transmission via other routes (Donohue et al., 2012) including deficient policies and procedures, improper hand hygiene, preparation of medication in blood processing areas, blood glucose monitoring, common-use saline bags, reuse of syringes, reuse of single-dose vials and use of multi-dose drug vials (Kermode et al., 2005; Greeley et al., 2011; Donohue et al., 2012). Perz et al. (2012) concluded that health care exposures may represent an important source of new HBV and HCV infections among older adults especially in ambulatory care settings through reduced oversight and fewer infection control resources. Strategies associated with injury prevention include avoidance of unnecessary needle use; unnecessary insertion of intravenous catheters; use of needleless or protected needle infusion systems and use of safer needles (Henderson, 2012). Health care associated infections and outbreaks of BBV have occurred in health care settings therefore it is necessary that a good infection control programme is in place (HIQA, 2009). Hand hygiene and adherence to SP are important in the prevention of spread of infections (SARI, 2005; Siegel et al., 2007). Reducing occupational exposure will reduce occupational infections with BBVs (Henderson, 2012). Education of staff is essential. Stein et al. (2003) observed the attitudes and compliance of medical staff to UP and recorded reasons for non-compliance. It concluded that while 86% of nurse's s attested to UP compliance, only 41% of doctors did. Education, monitoring, sufficient resources and disciplinary action for poor compliance are all necessary to improve infection control in hospitals (Stein et al., 2003). Although safety-engineered devices have been designed to cover sharps and eliminate all ‘after-use’ injuries, NSI still occur if these devices are used incorrectly. Thorough training and monitoring of the correct use of these safety devices is required (Perry et al., 2004). This training, together with regular education on blood-borne diseases, and infection prevention and control policies and procedures in the critical care unit lead to better management and prevention of BBV and increased safety for both staff and patients. Where direct educational update on the topics is not readily available, critical care nurses may take the initiative to perform independent learning on the topic in line with the development of their professional portfolio. Professional literature and readings on the topic are widely available and act as a good resource for the nurse looking to explore this topic within their portfolio.