Abstract
Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedru’s fable, i. e. a head that has nobrain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a “right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraudand violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedomcannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative.
Highlights
The concept of freedom is at the heart of Kant’s philosophy
Since the point at issue here is “the freedom of a rational being under moral laws” (MS, AA 06: 223), it seems safe to say that Kant believes that freedom as noninterference - independence from being constrained by another’s choice - is the same as the political right of participation in political legislation: the positive sense of freedom
What does it mean the universal law according to which my freedom must coexist with the freedom of every other that I can claim a right to freedom?
Summary
The concept of freedom is at the heart of Kant’s philosophy. It “constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason” (KpV, AA 05: 04). Keeping in mind Kant’s clarification of the concept of right as concerning external and practical relations of one person to another - and not concerning relations between one’s choice and another’s wishes or needs (as in acts of beneficence and callousness) - (MS AA 06: 230), it is very useful to appeal to Hart’s definition of coercion for a better understanding of the overall point of a right to freedom as a right not to be constrained by another’s choice: “Coercion includes, besides preventing a person from doing what he chooses, making his choice less eligible by threats”
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