Religious grounds in liberal politics

Abstract

I. Introduction Since this essay is drawn from the draft of a book entitled Private Consciences and Public Reasons,[1] putting the essay in context and explaining how it relates to criminal justice ethics may aid the reader to see its relevance. A number of theorists of liberal democracy have urged that officials, and perhaps citizens, should not rely on certain kinds of grounds for the making of political judgments and political arguments. In other words, some or all people should exercise a kind of self-restraint, declining to rely on grounds that might appropriately affect their actions in personal life. Some proposed principles of restraint are cast in terms of intuitive (as opposed to reasoned) grounds and in terms of comprehensive grounds (broad philosophies of life). Such principles include many, or all, religious grounds; and the history of religious conflict in Western Europe and the growth of toleration and liberal democracy out of that conflict inform all the principles. But these principles are not cast directly in terms of religious bases of judgment. Other principles are cast in this way, and in this essay, I address the idea that officials and citizens should refrain from relying on religious grounds in particular. The underlying claim is that such reliance is contrary to fundamental premises of religious liberty and of separation of church and state, or is particularly threatening to social life. The basic problem whether people should refrain from relying on religious grounds is one of political philosophy. Consideration of this problem might itself begin from some particular comprehensive view, such as Roman Catholicism or traditional Marxism; but my analysis here is meant to stand relatively free of competing religious premises and views about the good life. It does assume the validity of basic premises of liberal democracy, including most importantly religious liberty. Although what I say is not framed particularly in terms of acceptable premises for criminal laws, it does apply to those premises. Often the output of political deliberations is a prohibition supported by a criminal sanction: a law, say, against having a late abortion, engaging in homosexual acts, or hunting certain animals. Part of my inquiry is whether religious bases of judgment appropriately underlie such prohibitions. Many theorists treat liberal democracies as a general class, assuming that a principle of self-restraint good for one is good for all. Much of my book is directed at that assumption. I argue that much depends on the present composition of society and its values, illumined by history. In what follows here, I make remarks that reflect this claim, but I do not explicitly defend it. II. What Is Reliance on a Religious Ground Before exploring the arguments for a principle of self-restraint as to religion, I need first to explain what amounts to reliance on a religious ground. This involves brief comment on: religious grounds as opposed to other grounds; reliance at the time of decision as contrasted with mere causal influence; religious support for chains of common reason; and reliance on religious premises as compared with reliance on religiously influenced culture and religious symbols. A principle that one should not employ religious premises in political decision and argument would obviously cover the following excerpt from an imaginary speech given by a legislator, Leslie, against regulation of factory farming: The Book of Genesis clearly states that animals are for the benefit of human beings. Factory farming benefits human beings; God has told us that we need not worry about effects on animals. Even when a ground for judgment lacks explicit religious content, it can involve reliance on religion if a religious basis underlies it or motivates it. Thus, if someone opposing legally permitted suicide says, No one has a right to take his own life, this is a religious ground if the speaker believes the ground can only be supported by belief in God. …