Relief goods distribution problem: Considering donation strategies, fairness, and interventions

Abstract

Relief goods are donated to affected areas through the governmental organization (GO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and donors. This paper discusses a relief goods distribution problem composed of a GO, NGO, and donor base, the solution to which is an optimal distribution plan. A relief goods donation strategy wherein donors give not only to the NGO but also to affected areas is proposed. A model is proposed for the GO, NGO, and donor relief goods donation system. In this model, the GO is controlled by “fairness” among affected areas. The NGO is controlled by the amount of received relief goods and costs of performance and publicity. Donors are controlled by the utility received from the NGO and affected areas. Numerical experiments highlight the advantageous nature of considering support provided to the NGO by the GO. The effectiveness of the donors' strategy is verified. A series of suggestions are proffered to the GO based on the results of this work.