Abstract
Consider a distributed system that delivers each message from a process to its destination if the message transmission does not experience any faults and only delivers those sent by a non-faulty system process. Such a system is referred to as a reliable message passing system. A reliable message passing system requires a reliable channel, a communication channel between a pair of processes that always detects a fault in message transmission and each detected fault is an actual fault, to be implemented. In this paper, we first identify the necessary conditions to detect some restricted form of Byzantine Faults in a message passing system where n disjoint paths exist between each pair of endpoints. We consider Byzantine Faults (BF) whose effect is limited to the modification of a message metadata, omission faults, and message replay. We then present a protocol implementing a reliable channel in message passing systems in the presence of n — 1 Byzantine Faults using n disjoint paths between each pair of communication endpoints where the paths with faults are not known apriori. The proposed protocol detects Byzantine Faults, where each detected fault, an actual fault, authenticates message origins, identifies faulty paths and classifies faults in the presence of multiple messages sent by various system processes.
Highlights
Co mmunicat ion reliab ility and security are essential properties in co mputer networks
A channel with communicat ion authenticity, referred to as an authenticated channel, is imp lemented by recovering fro m lost and altered messages, and detecting spurious messages, i.e., messages generated in the system by sources other than the expected/intended source process
A reliable channel transmits only those messages sent by the source process to the destination process intact
Summary
Co mmunicat ion reliab ility and security are essential properties in co mputer networks. [4] shows that Byzantine modification detection capability can be added to a mu lticast scheme based on random linear block network coding, with modest additional computational and communicat ion overhead, by incorporating a simp le polynomial hash/check value in each packet With this approach, a sink node can detect Byzantine modifications with h igh probability, provided that these modifications have not been designed with knowledge of the random coding combinations present in all other packets obtained at the sink: the only essential condition is the adversary's incomp lete knowledge of the random network code seen by the sink. The algorith m performs sender authentication where the destination process detects changes in the sender id and messages sent by an adversary (imposter) process claiming the id of another process It identifies fau lty paths and the fault types allo wing various recovery methods to be adapted.
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