Abstract
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where agents must be matched to indivisible objects. Our first result is a novel characterization of strategyproof mechanisms by three intuitive axioms. Furthermore, we introduce partial strategyproofness , a new relaxation of strategyproofness that bridges the gap between full and weak strategyproofness. Partial strategyproofness finds application in the incentive analysis of non-strategyproof mechanisms, such as Probabilistic Serial, different variants of the Boston mechanism, and hybrid mechanisms. In this letter, we summarize the main results from [Mennle and Seuken 2014a] and demonstrate how they can be used for the design and analysis of matching mechanisms.
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