Abstract
We estimate the effects of antenatal food and cash transfers with women's groups on household allocative behaviour and explore whether these effects are explained by intergenerational bargaining among women. Interventions were tested in randomised-controlled trial in rural Nepal, in a food-insecure context where pregnant women are allocated the least adequate diets. We show households enrolled in a cash transfer intervention allocated pregnant women with 2–3 pp larger shares of multiple foods (versus their mothers-in-law and male household heads) than households in a control group. Households in a food transfer intervention only increased pregnant women's allocation of staple foods (by 2 pp). Intergenerational bargaining power may partly mediate the effects of the cash transfers but not food transfers, whereas household food budget and nutrition knowledge do not mediate any effects. Our findings highlight the role of intergenerational bargaining in determining the effectiveness of interventions aiming to reach and/or empower junior women.
Highlights
3 in other parts of the world (Akerele, 2011; Berti, 2012; Calvi, 2020; Coates et al, 2017)1,4 yet women are often responsible for these allocation decisions
How can we explain the effects of the food transfers on the allocation of staple foods? We find no evidence that the effects were mediated by changes in bargaining power, households’ total consumption, or nutrition knowledge
Nutrition knowledge did not improve in either treatment. Could these different effects on bargaining power and/or household food budget explain the differential effects on intra-household food allocation? We examine each pathway in turn
Summary
4 yet women are often responsible for these allocation decisions. In patrilocal-patrilineal. 7 mothers-in-law may influence the allocation of food Several studies have documented effects of gendered bargaining power – that is, women’s versus men’s ability to influence household decisions – on household-level consumption and expenditures (e.g., Attanasio and Lechene (2014); Hoddinott and Haddad (1995); Quisumbing and de La Brière (2000)). These studies find widely differing effects of gendered bargaining power on the shares of household budget spent on different goods.
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