Rejoinder by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko

Abstract

The Kolkos are correct in stating that the final words of my essay are strong. Since the words are dwelled upon at such length, it is appropriate to expand on their intended meaning. For some time I have been disturbed by the inclination of many scholars to write off the works of the Kolkos as distortions without taking the time to study them systematically. At the same time, others give them considerably more credit than may be their due. The end result is that the Kolkos gain a kind of respectability among many who, like myself, have been influenced profoundly by the international events and intellectual trends of the late 1960s. A sense of guilt and an irritation with old myths have, I suspect, led many to make concessions that could be both unwarranted and dangerous. The only way to find out for certain is to examine meticulously the theories and methods of books like The Limits of Power. In the theoretical area, some work has already been done; but the drudgery of examining the Kolkos' use of sources is just beginning. And ultimately the historian's sense of reality must depend on the most convincing synthesis of concrete sources, not a priori abstractions. Scholars cannot be expected to spend a lifetime at such a task as checking the Kolkos' footnotes. Nevertheless, if each of us does a little, it would not be long before we would have a more solid foundation for judging the ultimate worth of their work. If their methodology is found to be as unsound in many places as it is in the area I have examined, they should be denied the intellectual respect of the profession. If the presentation on the outbreak of war in Korea is found to be the exception, however, they should be granted positions of leadership in a general swing to the left among American diplomatic historians. In the meantime, those on both extremes would do well to lower their voices lest they descend intellectually into that irreducible dilemma of the scorpion and the tarantula in the bottle.