Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis

Abstract

IN RECENT YEARS, a revisionist approach to the origins of the Cold War has made great inroads in the United States. As a result, many-perhaps even most-scholars no longer place primary responsibility on the Soviet Union for great power tensions following World War II. Some even go so far as to place almost exclusive blame on the United States. With the publication in 1972 of The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954,1 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko became perhaps the leading spokesmen for this more radical view. Taking up where Gabriel's previous work on The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-19452 left off, The Limits of Power traces American foreign policy through the Harry S. Truman and early Dwight Eisenhower administrations. Simply stated, the Kolkos see the United States as taking the offensive in the international sphere, with the Soviet Union merely reacting to protect its security. The origins of this aggressive American policy are identified as the always expanding needs of a capitalist economy. Because of the largely uncontrolled economic growth of the United States, the search for overseas markets as an outlet for surplus products was ever present. Since economic penetration was merely a preliminary to political influence, the Soviet Union was forced to resist in areas deemed crucial to its security. Thus, the Cold War. The Politics of War has received great praise within New Left circles. Although The Limits of Power has not yet been reviewed by many journals, there is no reason to believe that its reception will be any less positive. Even among more traditionally-minded scholars, the Kolkos