Regulating Land Grabs: Third Party States, Social Activism and International Law

Abstract

This chapter explores how international law may regulate large-scale leases and acquisitions of land (“land grab”) that have accelerated in pace and scope in recent years. We start by identifying why the land grab phenomenon concerns food security. In particular, we observe that the lessor countries (those where the land is located) are almost invariably states plagued by corruption, lack of democracy, dependence on food aid, and weak property rights. Where agents (state leaders) have conflicts of interests with their principals (citizens) it cannot be assumed that these transactions will work to the local population’s advantage. After examining why international investment law is not equipped to police these transactions, we turn to sources within trade law. Because trade law concerns the cross border flow of products, it has the potential to de-incentivize food from leaving land grabbed states and deter similar transactions in the future. The central question, then, is whether World Trade Organization (WTO) law accommodates strategies that are designed specifically to discourage particular categories of free trade. Drawing on recent WTO jurisprudence, we propose labeling laws and import restrictions as potential regulations that may be adopted by third party states.