Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

Chapter 1 outlined (West) Germany’s role in the development of European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht. A combination of the structural constraints of the Cold War (and its immediate aftermath) and the difficulties in forging a truly CFSP within the European Union (EU) ensured that CFSP remained a useful addition to national foreign and security policy, rather than a central institution in which national policy was constructed. The impact and legacy of the Cold War reduced the opportunities for (West) Germany to upload its foreign-policy preferences to the European level. In addition, the lack of substantive progress in developing institutions and policies within the European Community (EC)/EU greatly limited the adaptational pressures on German foreign policy emerging from Brussels. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remained the pre-eminent security institution in Europe even after the Berlin Wall had been demolished. These limitations reinforced the lack of Europeanisation witnessed in German foreign and security policy. This chapter examines the legacy of the decisions taken at Maastricht in the realm of CFSP at a time when the pressure for the EU to be a more active foreign policy actor increased significantly.