Abstract

This essay relates to proper names and how they can refer to individual persons, animals, or objects. An initial response to this question was the classical descriptivist theory. This theory was introduced by Frege and Russell, and presented the idea that we can think about specific things only indirectly via descriptive thoughts. Kripke developed a series of powerful arguments against descriptivism and proposed a casual theory for the referring function of proper names. The main idea in the causal approach is in passing on a name and its reference from one person to another. Another interesting approach to consider is predicativism, or the idea that proper names are just a special kind of common noun and that their semantic function is to designate properties of individuals. These approaches ─descriptive, causal, and predicative─. open a set of perspectives regarding a philosophical analysis of proper names, but offer no overarching bigger picture; consequently, there can be no secure consensus. Therefore, this paper proposes a phenomenological alternative that takes these useful elements and adds the idea that, in referring, the way an individual experiences the world is essential. The idea implies a two-way picture of reference-fixing, where the name and the referent are not necessarily a duality. The name refers to an object, but the object is presented as having that name as an aspect. If no individual object or person is presented to us as having a particular proper name as an aspect, the name is meaningless and does not refer.

Highlights

  • The propositional approach to the world using subjects and the corresponding predicates based on ‘S is p’, should ensure that the reference and the meaning in propositions is constituted clearly

  • In the case of specific individual things, some situations can go beyond the third-person perspective when the named object implies dynamic features, for instance, when choosing that a perspective is relevant, as in Frege’s infamous example of ‘Hesperus and phosphorus’, or when a name itself conveys a subjectively interpreted meaning, as in Kripke’s widely cited example of ‘Jack the Ripper’

  • The analytic approach opens up a set of perspectives regarding philosophical approaches to proper names, but it offers no overarching bigger picture

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Summary

Introduction

The propositional approach to the world using subjects and the corresponding predicates based on ‘S is p’, should ensure that the reference and the meaning in propositions is constituted clearly. In the case of specific individual things (e.g., proper names), some situations can go beyond the third-person perspective when the named object implies dynamic features, for instance, when choosing that a perspective is relevant, as in Frege’s infamous example of ‘Hesperus and phosphorus’, or when a name itself conveys a subjectively interpreted meaning, as in Kripke’s widely cited example of ‘Jack the Ripper’. In such situations, the analytic duality of object vs meaning and subject vs predicate becomes less obvious. The central research question is ‘How is the referential act really being performed?’

The Situation
Methodological Considerations
Approaching the Reference of Proper Names
A Summary of the Analytic Perspectives of Referencing
Proper Names as Phenomenological Aspects
The Unifying Quality of Phenomenological Reference-Fixing Descriptions
Conclusion
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