Redefine and practise our peace, our security, if they do theirs

Abstract

I. Between the Two Summits: The Problem in a New Context WE ARE GATHERED HERE IN OKINAWA (JAPAN) TO DISCUSS PEOPLE'S SECURITY, justice, and and to develop action across Asia and beyond to attain them. We feel that we are meeting at the right time and in the right place. This is the right time, sandwiched between the two summits. The first is the South-North Korean summit in Pyongyang, in June 2000. This initiated a historic process of a whole people taking upon themselves the task of settling one of the most crucial and difficult post-World War II issues of East Asia -- peace, reconciliation, and autonomous national reunification of the divided Korea. The stated premise of the U.S. East Asia strategy -- the clear and present danger from the rogue of North Korea -- is collapsing and undermining the legitimacy of the heavy U.S. military presence in East Asia. This raises great hope for in our region. The second meeting is the G-8 summit of self-appointed world leaders who will come here in July and meet in Nago, the precise location where the United States, with the willing support of the Japanese government, is forcing a brand new military base on the Okinawa people. The late Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi, who provocatively chose Nago as the venue of the 2000 summit, declared that the Okinawa summit would send out a of peace to the rest of the world. President Clinton praised Obuchi's wisdom and welcomed this summit as the opportunity to demonstrate again the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Their message is clear: Bases equals Peace. The Okinawan people, however, are irrevocably against bases. Thus, Okinawa is the right place for this gathering. Okinawa has been, and continues to be, a major site of sustained popular protest against the massive U.S. military presence. Due to their devastating experience of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, when over 160,000 civilians were killed, and in their ongoing struggle against U.S. bases, the people of Okinawa have developed an idea of and security that is clearly differentiated from the notion of as the product of military presence, and the notion of security as state security. Strategically, Okinawa, as the single largest overseas U.S. military base in the world, is called the lynchpin of U.S. military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It is where 75% of U.S. bases in the Japanese territory are concentrated, occupying about 20% of the best land of this small island. In the post-Cold War context, the role of Okinawa is being strengthened as the U.S.-Japan military alliance is redefined. Let me briefly sketch the current state of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States has adopted a military doctrine for the East Asian-Pacific region that justifies continued U.S. military presence and parcels out for a heavier military role than even at the height of the Cold War. The landmark event in accomplishing this shift in Japan's role was the 1996 redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This was followed by new U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, adopted in 1997. This bilateral arrangement obliges to mobilize its public and private resources, personnel, facilities, services, and its military force to join American military operations to be conducted in surrounding Japan. The Guidelines define the concept of surrounding Japan not as geographical, but as situational. Although the surrounding certainly include Korea and the Taiwan Strait, they could also include any areas in the world. For the United States , keeping its bases in Okinawa is the key to this strategy. One alarming development is that the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance has provided the momentum for Japanese ruling groups to free the postwar Japanese state from its constitutional constraints. The postwar constitution has a pacifist clause that bans the military and renounces the state's right to belligerency. …