Abstract
ObjectivesWe test the effects of four policy scenarios on recruitment into organized crime. The policy scenarios target (i) organized crime leaders and (ii) facilitators for imprisonment, (iii) provide educational and welfare support to children and their mothers while separating them from organized-crime fathers, and (iv) increase educational and social support to at-risk schoolchildren.MethodsWe developed a novel agent-based model drawing on theories of peer effects (differential association, social learning), social embeddedness of organized crime, and the general theory of crime. Agents are simultaneously embedded in multiple social networks (household, kinship, school, work, friends, and co-offending) and possess heterogeneous individual attributes. Relational and individual attributes determine the probability of offending. Co-offending with organized crime members determines recruitment into the criminal group. All the main parameters are calibrated on data from Palermo or Sicily (Italy). We test the effect of the four policy scenarios against a baseline no-intervention scenario on the number of newly recruited and total organized crime members using Generalized Estimating Equations models.ResultsThe simulations generate realistic outcomes, with relatively stable organized crime membership and crime rates. All simulated policy interventions reduce the total number of members, whereas all but primary socialization reduce newly recruited members. The intensity of the effects, however, varies across dependent variables and models.ConclusionsAgent-based models effectively enable to develop theoretically driven and empirically calibrated simulations of organized crime. The simulations can fill the gaps in evaluation research in the field of organized crime and allow us to test different policies in different environmental contexts.
Highlights
Countries around the world have adopted criminal and non-criminal policies to tackle organized crime including specialized law enforcement, harsh penalties, witness protection, and extensive follow-the-money asset forfeiture policies
More socially-oriented criminologists typically draw on differential association and social learning theory to posit that organized crime is embedded in the social environment and that social relations are crucial in driving recruitment
We model the social embeddedness in organized crime by adding one element to the selection of co-offenders whenever crimes requiring two or more co-offenders are initiated by organized crime members
Summary
Countries around the world have adopted criminal and non-criminal policies to tackle organized crime including specialized law enforcement, harsh penalties, witness protection, and extensive follow-the-money asset forfeiture policies. One fundamental divide, reflecting a deep and longstanding debate in criminology and the social sciences more broadly, is between explanations that focus on the individual and their dispositions (or psychologies) and those that place the emphasis on social or relational factors (Posick and Rocque 2018) Researchers who adopt the former approach often rely on the general theory of crime to claim that organized crime is a process mainly driven by individual traits and self-selection. Differential association theory (Sutherland 1937, 1947; Burgess and Akers 1966) and social learning theory (Akers et al 1979) suggest that organized crime is embedded in the social environment and that social relations are a crucial factor driving recruitment into organized crime. The learning process involves the acquisition of techniques, attitudes and rationalizations that are justifying criminal behavior, as well as the internalization of criminal identity aspects
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