Abstract
This paper attempts to gauge the relevance of new conceptions of personhood & rationality (the Person) put forth by various empirical sciences such as cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics to Rawls's political philosophy and its conception of the person. I conclude that though the New Person is a deep challenge to the Rawlsian account, the best response is to reconstruct a new Rawlsian account on the basis of the New Person. That is to say, I suggest retaining the method of moral constructivism, and the overall aim of constructing principles of justice for society, but advocate moving from the Kantian-inspired Rawlsian person to a conception more explicitly drawing from the New Person.
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