Abstract
Abstract This article offers a theoretical perspective on the dispute about the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It seeks to revise and adapt the framework of justice advanced in John Rawls's Political Liberalism so as to respond effectively to this particular conflict of identities. This necessitates two significant revisions to the structure of Rawls's theory. These revisions allow us to formulate a principle of justice that could, it is suggested, be the focus of a reasonable overlapping consensus in this context. The article maintains that the generation of such a consensus will be far more demanding than Rawls's liberalism implies. The argument shows that only a theoretical approach which stretches significantly the limits of liberal political theory can give a convincing account of how a just constitutional settlement could be achieved in Northern Ireland.
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