Reconciling the Epistemological Differences between Soft and Hard Information Systems Methodologies

Abstract

The purpose of this work is to examine the basic epistemological foundations of soft and hard information systems (IS) methodologies, and to explore ways in which the much- purported differences between these foundations may be reconciled. A number of writers have discussed the philosophical underpinnings of Soft Systems Methodology (SSM); the general conclusion being that SSM embodies the philosophical assumptions of (some form of) subjectivism (e.g. Mingers, 1984). It will be argued that whilst the advocates of SSM subscribe to a subjective mode of enquiry, such a mode has its history—and its rationale—firmly grounded in the early modern philosophies of the natural sciences. In contemporary epistemological terms, this approach can be characterised as a variant of foundationalism. Lewis has recently studied the epistemological foundations of hard IS methodologies (Lewis, 1994). Although these methodologies are generally committed to an approach based on objectivist assumptions, they are also based on a variant of foundationalism. Having explored the overlaps between hard and soft IS methodologies’ epistemological foundations, it will be concluded that there are important epistemological similarities between the two broad approaches, and that the differences between the approaches are not insurmountable. This paper therefore serves as a basis upon which a genuinely “unified” (hard and soft) IS methodology can be developed.