Recognition of Governments

Abstract

The thrust of the statement was that effectiveness would generally be a necessary precondition for governmental status, but it would not necessarily be a guarantee of 'normal Government to Government' relations. In British practice, recognition and the establishment of intergovernmental relations are primarily exercised in an international context. However, recognition and, now we must say, intergovernmental relations, do have domestic implications. At common law, the right of a State or Government to sue or to claim immunity in the English courts depended upon its being recognised by the British government. Also, the willingness of the courts to take notice of the acts and decrees of a foreign authority depended upon its being recognised by the British government.2 Whether an authority was recognised by the government was to be conclusively determined by an executive certificate presented to the court by the government.-3 The domestic implications of the new policy were not easy to discern. Whether the courts would look for 'implied recognition' from the British government's conduct, whether they would switch their attention from forrnal status to effectiveness, and what, in either case were the evidential consequences, would become apparent only in practice. In fact, the practice has been remarkably slow in accumulating. While there have been several occasions since 1980 on which the British government has found it necessary to reiterate its 'we do not recognise governments' policy in political contexts,4 with the rather anomalous exception of Gur v Trust Bank of A:+iica,5 which concerned the status of Ciskei, the new policy has not been considered by the courts. Part of the explanation for this is that occasions to do so will arise only after an unconstitutional seizure of power by a new authority within an existing State. There are no difficulties about constitutional succession of