Abstract

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve through reciprocity. Reciprocal cooperation is the process in which lasting social interactions provide the opportunity to learn about others' behavior, and to further predict the outcome of future encounters. Lasting social interactions may also decrease aversion to unequal distribution of gains – when individuals accept inequity payoffs knowing about the possibility of future encounters. Thus, reciprocal cooperation and aversion to inequity can be complementary phenomena. The present study investigated the effects of cooperative and uncooperative interactions on participants' aversion to disadvantageous inequity. Participants played an experimental task in the presence of a confederate who acted as a second participant. In reality, the participant interacted with a computer programed to make cooperative and uncooperative choices. After interacting with a cooperative or uncooperative computer, participants chose between blue cards to produce larger gains to the computer and smaller for him/her or green cards to produce equal and smaller gains for both. Results confirmed our first hypothesis that uncooperative interactions would produce aversion to disadvantageous inequity. Lastly, half of the participants were informed that points received during the experiment could be later exchanged for money, and half were not. Results indicated that information about monetary outcomes did not affect aversion to inequity, contradicting our second hypothesis. We discuss these results in the light of theories of reciprocal cooperation, inequity aversion, and conformity.

Highlights

  • To explain the ways in which cooperation can evolve among unrelated individuals, Trives (1971) proposed the notion of reciprocity

  • The present study evaluated participants’ choices in the DITest conditions after interactions with a cooperative and uncooperative computer

  • The results of the present study support the main hypotheses: Despite disadvantageous inequity, the participants cooperated under Disadvantageous Inequity Test (DI-Test) conditions in a similar proportion that the computer was programmed to cooperate under prior conditions

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Summary

Introduction

To explain the ways in which cooperation can evolve among unrelated individuals, Trives (1971) proposed the notion of reciprocity. Szolnoki and Perc (2015) discussed how conformity (i.e., choosing the most common strategy within a group) can increase reciprocity in social dilemmas and affect cooperation. Children and adults cooperate more when playing with the same partner multiple times (e.g., Dal Bó, 2005; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Blake et al, 2015b). Adults’ reciprocal responses in a puzzle game were modulated by confederates’ percentage of cooperative plays (e.g., Ribes-Iñesta et al, 2010; Avalos et al, 2015). In a prisoner’s dilemma game, adults cooperated when the probability of reciprocity was high between the dyad (e.g., Silverstein et al, 1998; Baker and Rachlin, 2001)

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