Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract

Past empirical studies of superpower reciprocity have produced inconsistent results that may be traced to several recurrent methodological problems. Correcting these problems, I analyzed statistically the responses of the United States and the Soviet Union to each other's actions over the past forty years. Results were replicated across quasi-experiments using different data sources, time periods, and model specifications. Both superpowers reciprocate each other's actions within a short time frame of up to about two months. Neither responds inversely (for example, by becoming more cooperative following hostile actions by the other). In the 1950s and 1960s U.S. reciprocity following Soviet actions was much more consistent than Soviet reciprocity following U.S. actions, but in the 1970s and 1980s Soviet reciprocity was more consistent than U.S. reciprocity.