Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work?

Abstract

The impact of reciprocity on mutual cooperation in asymmetric situations has been inadequately studied. Asymmetry can include both preference differences and power imbalances. Distinguishing between the conditions under which reciprocity yields a desirable outcome and those under which it does not, the following are suggested: First, if mutual cooperation is preferable to unilateral defection and unrequited cooperation is preferred to mutual defection then cooperate is always the preferred course of action. Secondly, if an actor believes that their opponent will not cooperate but mutual defection represents the worst outcome then unrequited cooperation is the probably outcome. Third, reciprocity is recommended 1) when mutual cooperation represents the best outcome while unrequited cooperation is the worst outcome, 2) when both parties prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection and both prefer mutual defection to unrequited cooperation, or 3) when the opponent surely prefers mutual cooperation most. These suggestions with the exception of unilateral concession can be inferred from symmetric payoff structures. The theories of reciprocity based on symmetry can be extended to asymmetry with some restrictions. This has some implications in controversies over soft power or coercion. This work was supported by a research grant from Hallym University, Korea.