Reasons

Abstract

Abstract The notion of a reason for action – a practical reason – is not a specifically moral notion. We can sensibly talk about the reasons that favor and disfavor a choice of career or, less momentously, a choice of vacation options, even when morality is simply not an issue. Indeed, we can talk about the reasons that someone stranded on a desert island might have – for building a shelter in a certain way, or for storing food – even if we think that morality is exclusively concerned with behavior toward other people. Although individual practical reasons need not, therefore, have any particular moral significance, it is no surprise that the notion of a reason plays a central role in much of ethical theory. There have been many attempts to ground morality in such reasons. And it is quite common to encounter the thesis – whether it is being affirmed or denied – that moral behavior is always favored by the balance of reasons ( see Overridingness, Moral). This thesis is consistent with the plausible idea that there can be particular reasons that oppose moral action. Such reasons would be present, for example, in any case in which morality requires a sacrifice of some sort.