Reason's debt to freedom: normative appraisals, reasons, and free will

Abstract

Chapter 1. Freedom, Normative Judgments, and Reason 1.1. Freedom and Normative Judgments: The Basic Issues 1.2. A Brief Outline Chapter 2 Reasons and Alternative Possibilities 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Types of Reason 2.3. A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Objective Pro Tanto Reasons 2.3.1. Wrong Implies Can 2.3.2. Objections to Wrong Implies Can 2.4. An Alternative Possibilities Requirement for Right, Wrong, and 2.5. Some Objections Chapter 3. Moral Obligation, Prudential Obligation, and Alternative Possibilities 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Moral Obligation, Reason, and Alternative Possibilities 3.3. Objections to the View that Moral Obligation Requires Alternatives 3.3.1. A Problem with the Derivation 3.3.2. The Challenge of Frankfurt Examples 3.3.3. Reliance on Ought Implies Can 3.4. Prudential Obligation, Reason, and Alternative Possibilities 3.5. Objections to the View that Prudential Obligation Requires Alternatives 3.5.1. Prudence or Self-Interest? 3.5.2. Prudential Obligation and Objective Pro Tanto Reasons 3.5.3. A Challenge from Frankfurt Examples Chapter 4. Axiological Appraisals and Alternative Possibilities 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Intrinsic Value and Reasons 4.3. A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Intrinsic Value 4.4. The Morally Deontic's Dependence on the Axiological 4.5. Pleasure and Reasons 4.6. Virtue and Reasons Chapter 5. Moral Sentiments and Alternative Possibilities 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Forgiveness and Reasons 5.3. Indignation and Reasons 5.4. Guilt, Sorrow, and Reasons 5.5. Gratitude, Joy, Thankfulness, and Reasons 5.6. The Moral Sentiments and Alternative Possibilities Chapter 6. Determinism's Impact on Normative Judgments 6.1. Introduction 6.2. Incompatibilism, Strong Alternatives, and Normative Assessments 6.2.1. Incompatibilism, Strong Alternatives, and Intrinsic Value 6.2.2. Incompatibilism, Strong Alternatives, Welfare, and Happiness 6.2.3. Incompatibilism, Strong Alternatives, and Moral Responsibility 6.2.4. Incompatibilism, Strong Alternatives, and the Moral Sentiments 6.3. Libertarianism, Luck, and Normative Appraisals 6.4. Compatibilism, Weak Alternatives, and Normative Judgments 6.5. On the Viability of Semi-Compatibilism 6.6. Revisiting Frankfurt Examples 6.7. Other Varieties of Semi-Compatibilism Appendix A: Agent Causation and Luck Chapter 7 Imperiled Compatibilist Approaches 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Strawsonian Semi-Compatibilism 7.2.1. An Outline of Strawsonian Compatibilism 7.2.2. Reactive Attitudes, Obligation, and Alternative Possibilities 7.2.3. Another Pathway to Questioning Strawsonian Semi-Compatibilism 7.3. Mesh Theories 7.3.1. Hierarchical Control and Reason 7.3.2. Assessment of the Revised Hierarchical View 7.4. Wolf's Reason View 7.5. Watson's Mesh Theory 7.6. Concluding Remarks on Reasons-Responsiveness Accounts of Control Chapter 8 Conclusion 8.1. Summary of the Argument 8.2. Primary Ramifications