Reasons and psychological explanation

Abstract

There are often many reasons that can be given for the same action. Some reasons are causes, that is, they are present before the action, and without them the action would not have occurred. However, other reasons are, I argue, applied to an action after it has occurred. They are a kind of justification but in affixing a meaning to an action they also change that action's consequences. When we choose one reason over another, we are both justifying the action and bringing into being a possible cause of future action. Good reasons must therefore not only be consistent with the causes of the action that they justify but must also have their own causal powers. Reason descriptions cannot be replaced by descriptions of causes, but nor can reasons be discounted as justifications because they are without any causal properties. A full account of human beings requires both types of explanations, reasons and causes, and some bridge which links the two of them. This paper attempts to lay the foundation for this bridge.