Reason-Giving and Action-Guiding in Morality

Abstract

How exactly are moral considerations reasons for acting? Kant answered by saying that moral considerations are a matter of duty, of a law which commands action. Philosophers have not alwaays felt satisfied with this answer, and some of them, such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Mill, have even raised specific objections to it. Recently, Philippa Foot has held that the fact that moral considerations are reasons for acting cannot be accounted for unless it is admitted that morality consists of hypothetical imperatives.1 In her opinion, Kanťs view that morality gives reasons for acting precisely because it consists of categorical imperatives is unintelligible,2 even, perhaps, a kind of fraud.3 In Part I of this paper I want to make three distinctions in terms of which the sort of claim Foot makes can be clearly stated. In Part II, I want to defend Kant against this sort of claim.