Reasonable Doubt about Reasonable Doubt: Assessing Jury Instruction Adequacy in a Capital Case

Abstract

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has long been the standard in US criminal cases, while preponderance of the evidence is the standard in civil cases. A large body of research documents the problems jurors face as they wrestle with the language of jury instructions that attempt to clarify such concepts as reasonable doubt, seldom defined in jury instructions (see for example Tanford, 1990; Charrow and Charrow, 1979; Steele and Thornburg, 1988; Tanford, 1991; Tiersma, 1993, 1995; Lieberman and Sales, 1997). It is clear that the instructions are usually, perhaps always, confusing to jurors and that jurors’ questions about their instructions are generally not answered. This article traces the history of a capital case in Texas in order to summarise problems with reasonable doubt and other language in the jury instructions that were identified by testifying linguists.1