Is "Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" a Self-Evident Concept? Considering the U.S. and the Italian Legal Cultures towards the Understanding of the Standard of Persuasion in Criminal Cases

Abstract

With its fundamental decision In re Winship (1970) the United States Supreme Court set the constitutional basis of the standard of persuasion in criminal trials. The long standing standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt" was selected by the Court as the bedrock that protects the values at stake in a criminal case.Soon after this decision a dispute started between scholars and Courts on whether the “reasonable doubt standard" ought to be defined by jury instructions or could be considered a matter of the jurors' “original understanding," that is a “self-evident" concept. Depending on the solution of the dispute, failing to define the standard through suitable instruction could amount to a reversible constitutional error (i.e. a constitutional error that imposes reversal).In 2006 the highly discussed law n.46 introduced the standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ( prova “al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio") in the Italian Criminal Procedure Code. The law does not define the standard but just states it.Even prior to this, in Italy, the standard at issue had been applied in important decisions by the Corte di Cassazione and some scholars had strongly argued the need of its introduction in the Italian criminal system. Both the Italian courts and Italian scholars had impliedly or explicitly referred to the U.S. legal experience for guidance.The U.S. and Italian criminal systems are notably different. Apart from the differences in substantial criminal law, those in criminal procedure are pronounced. According to these differences it is possible to argue that the same standard of persuasion might be given a different regime of application in the two systems. The present paper doesn't deal with this last issue, but is based on the premise that the concept itself of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt" has the same significance in the two systems.The aim of this paper is to show that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt," far from being a self-evident concept, needs accurate explanation.In order to do that, the paper studies the Italian and the U.S. legal cultures on the subject; that is, using Lawrence M. Friedman's words, “the ideas, values, expectations and attitudes – towards the standard - which some public or some part of the public holds."First, it focuses on the so called “external legal culture" remembering that this kind of legal culture has, through the institution of the jury, a peculiar weight in the application of the law in the U.S. criminal system. At this stage, the study also takes into account the “ideas of the standard" that emerge from movies, literature and newspapers.Afterwards the paper quickly focuses on the so called “internal legal culture," studying relevant decisions and doctrinal contributions to the subject.The consideration of the Italian and U.S. legal cultures leads to the conclusion that there is widespread confusion on the concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt" even within the community of lawyers and judges. For a correct understanding of the standard there is the need for a definition and, especially, for the specification of its rationales and its contents.Thus, the last goal of the paper is to point out the fundamental traits of the reasonable doubt standard with the help of the legal cultures previously assessed. A hint is also offered by some linguistic and further sociological consideration.The hope is to contribute, even slightly, to the understanding and therefore the application of such an important rule.