Abstract
Social contract theorists rely upon the idea of agreement as a framework for justification, but differ in their characterization of the parties to agree ment. Some contract theorists, such as Buchanan and Gauthier, begin with willful agents who are moved solely by their own subjective ends. Rawls, on the other hand, imagines an agreement reached by parties who are moved exclusively by impersonal concerns, which make no reference at all to the parties' particular commitments. This paper criticizes both of these con tract views, arguing that subjectivist contract theories fail to acknowledge the role of impersonal reasons in bringing persons to a principled accom modation, while Rawls rejects the legitimate moral claims arising from our particularity. The paper defends an alternative contract view, which envi sions an agreement reached by persons who are partial to their own interests, but willing to consider impartially the claims of others.
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