Abstract
How much of an anti-realist is Husserl? Or to put it differently, how many of our realist intuitions can his transcendental idealism accommodate? In Chapter 6, I contrast Husserl’s position with two allegedly realist views, namely speculative realism and neuro-representationalism, and argue that Husserl’s theory might be in a better position to defend our natural realism than either of these two alternatives. I next discuss to what extent Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism is motivated by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience and ward off a form of global scepticism. As will become clear, not unlike Kant, Husserl did not merely think that transcendental idealism and empirical realism are compatible, he also thought that the latter requires the former.
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