Realism and Idealism: Evolutionary Epistemology

Abstract

The conclusion of the preceding chapter is likely to produce a variety of reactions. In particular, it is likely to reopen the question of realism and idealism. The idealist has been patiently biding his time since the conclusion of Chapter III. There, you will recall, I completed the argument, begun with the exploration of Realist Cores in Chapter II, that, for the kinds of beings which we are — for apperceptive, temporally discursive intelligences — idealism (“from within”) is not a possible metaphysics. Now, however, since I have divorced the concept of correctness entirely from the correspondences posited by the Criteriological Realist, since I have, in this way, “divided through by the world”, our idealist comes to life again. He begins by reminding us of another Kantian distinction. In establishing that idealism is not a possible metaphysics for us “from within”, he claims, what I have shown is that we must be Empirical Realists. But now I have gone on, as he suspected, to secure the balance of the Kantian picture. Kant, he reminds us, was an Empirical Realist — but he was also a Transcendental Idealist. Idealism may not be a possible metaphysics “from within” — but it is the only possible metaphysics “from outside”!