Abstract

In the spirit of new public management and new governance concepts, states have shifted from hierarchical and bureaucratic models of welfare administration to more flexible and market-oriented arrangements. As part of this transformation, states designed new accountability structures to cope with the accountability challenges of these administration regimes. The article examines the suitability and effectiveness of these new structures of accountability through an in-depth case study of the Wisconsin Works program, one of the most prominent experiments in new governance methods of welfare administration. The article shows that, during a decade of implementation, the Wisconsin Works program shifted back to a centralized and bureaucratized style of administration. The article analyzes the underlying forces that led to re-bureaucratization. It suggests that relatively tight methods of control are inherent in the administration of such complex and politically sensitive welfare programs.

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