Raz on Liberal Rights and Common Goods

Abstract

Much of contemporary political and legal philosophy can be seen as a reaction against utilitarianism. The works of Rawls, Dworkin, and Nozick are, in one way or another, dominated by the aim of developing a political theory to replace utilitarianism. Theories of rights figure prominently in this development. Rights have been portrayed as having the function to put limits on the pursuit of the general welfare or collective interest. This function, as Ronald Dworkin puts it, presupposes 'an antagonism between appeals to rights and appeals to the general welfare'.1 It might be thought that this kind of modern rights-talk has swung the pendulum from one end to another: while being sensitive to the utilitarian bias towards the collectivity, the rights-talk over-emphasizes the extent to which individual interest is antagonistic to the general interest of society. Joseph Raz is one such philosopher holding this view. He challenges the popular understanding that the special role of rights is to represent the individual interest against the general good or claims of others generally.2 The theory of rights he proposes can be seen as an attempt to avoid both the alleged utilitarian error and the one-sidedness of the modern rights-talk. For Raz, a right is neither an instrument to maximize aggregate happiness nor a trump card over the collective interest. This is particularly true in the case of liberal rights. A liberal right at once protects both the right-holder's interest as well as the interests of others.