Rawlsian Political Identity

Abstract

In the preceding chapters, I’ve discussed the contours of the debate between the liberals and communitarians, which I’ve suggested connects in important ways with the more general debate over perfectionism versus anti-perfectionism in politics. That debate also connects with the conceptions of persons that are at work in Rawls’s theory—the conception of the person in the original position and the political conception of the person. As I said at the outset, the main goal of this book is to articulate and defend a Rawlsian conception of political identity. Up to now, my goal has been to lay the groundwork needed to show the considerations relevant to a conception of political identity. I also have tried to explain the tension between the considerations that are (arguably) most salient in personal identity and those that are most salient for justifying political principles to—and thereby coercive force over—a polity characterized by intractable disagreement on reasonable conceptions of what is intrinsically valuable. It is this tension that Rawls’s critics have seized on, yielding the metaphysical and normative objections explained in earlier chapters. Surveying the objections provided a framework for seeing the kinds of consideration that are relevant to the project of defending a conception of political identity. I now turn to the more positive project of explaining and justifying a Rawlsian conception of political identity. This discussion is intended to lay the groundwork for thinking through the issues surrounding political identity in general as well as how one could justify Rawlsian political identity. It is beyond the scope of this book fully to explain and defend these views.