Political Identity, Perfectionism, and Neutrality

Abstract

In this chapter, I introduce and explain the relation between three seemingly conflicting claims that guide the discussion throughout the book. I argue that Rawls’s conception of political identity can reconcile the apparent conflict between these claims. The first claim is Embedded Essential Characteristics, which is the claim that characteristics that are essential to personhood or personal identity are, at least to some extent, embedded in or partially constituted by persons’ societies or values. The second claim, Public Justification, is the claim that the coercive power of the government must be justified to the people subject to the coercion by reasons they accept. The third claim is The Fact of Disagreement, which concerns the fact that liberal democratic societies are characterized by intractable disagreement on citizens’ fundamental values. In the first chapter, I use these three claims to explain how the issues in the liberal/communitarian debate relate to the current discussion of perfectionism versus neutrality in politics. I explain why looking back at the liberal/communitarian debate, which focused on Rawls’s conception of persons, can be useful as a vehicle for assessing the current perfectionism/neutrality debate as well as for developing a viable conception of political identity.