Rationality and the Objectivity of Values

Abstract

One of the central themes of Hilary Putnam's recent book, Reason, Truth and History, is the objectivity of values. The objectivity of values is a central component of the position Putnam calls realism. Inter nal is an attempt to delimit a point of view which is, on the one hand, objective, and, on the other, non-absolutistic. Internal is located precariously between an absolutist position which Putnam calls realism and a sceptical relativism. The trick is to maintain the viability of the middle way without having the position collapse into either extreme. In this paper, I want, first, to outline the steps Putnam employs to articulate and defend his view, and second, to evaluate the ex tent to which Putnam is successful in threading his way between metaphysical and scepticism. Putnam is not completely successful insofar as the end of the book signals a partial return to the metaphysical realist position from which Putnam had been at such pains earlier to distance himself. The scheme of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I lay out the internal realist position and distinguish it from metaphysical and sceptical relativism. In section 3, Putnam's central argument against metaphysical realism, which Putnam claims is also an argument against reductionism, is presented and discussed. In section 4, Putnam's case for the objectivity of epistemic values, based upon considerations of rationali ty, is examined. In section 5, it is shown how the objectivity of epistemic values, conjoined with the anti-reductionist argument of section 3, leads Putnam to argue for the objectivity of ethical and aesthetic values as well. Finally, the extent to which Putnam's position maintains its balance be tween and relativism is discussed.