Abstract
Recent laboratory research on the psychology of problem solving has important implications for an understanding of the psychology of science. Such work is reviewed, and supports the claim made by Hardin in this journal that pursuit of confirmatory data is highly adaptive in scientific problem solving. Hardin's reservations about the generalizability of such research to real science are considered, and rejected on empirical grounds. Further research bearing on the same issue is discussed, revealing that confirmatory strategies alone are less useful than mixed strategies that employ confirmatory and disconfirmatory approaches. The validity of the claim is supported by brief consideration of Michael Faraday's research strategies.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
